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This volume is the first fruit of the Philodemus Translation Project, which involves David 
Armstrong, Jeff Fish, Constantina Romeo, James Porter and Richard Janko, and is dedicated to 
the editing and publication of the aesthetic works of the 1st century BC Epicurean philosopher 
and poet Philodemus of Gadara.  Forthcoming volumes are to include two further volumes of On 
Poems, and also On Rhetoric, and On Music.  Dirk Obbink’s edition of Philodemus On Piety, 
Part One appeared in 1996, and Part Two is expected from OUP in 2003.  So Janko’s (J.) book is 
part of an extraordinary and very valuable resurgence of scholarship on Philodemus and the 
Herculaneum papyri.   
J. tells us of the great difficulty of his task in producing this edition at the beginning of his 
preface (v), where, after quoting Siegfried Sudhaus’ 1890 exhortation to the reconstruction and 
deciphering of the Herculaneum papyri, he writes: 
 
Then, as now, the task was Herculean: editing what are probably the most damaged, disordered, 
and difficult fragments to survive from classical antiquity. 
 
A little later, on the restoration of Philodemus On Poems Book One itself (vi): 
 
The relative ordering of its fragments was a nightmarish task, truly the hardest that I have ever 
attempted (apart from establishing their absolute order!).  It recalled to me the study of 
archaeological stratigraphy, with which it shares the need to think in three dimensions; just as in 
sorting, strewing, and joining potsherds, one matches them up by shape and decoration, so too I 
had to develop practical techniques for matching fragments.  I had to make a model of the roll in 
which I could constantly reorder the pieces, study a vast range of material outside my previous 
experience, and question constantly my every assumption, however obvious it appeared. 
The restoration of the books was so difficult that no one person seemed likely to have all the 
knowledge, or the time needed for its completion; a collective enterprise by a variety of experts 
was called for.  To this end I organized the Philodemus Translation Project, to edit and translate 
the three aesthetic works of Philodemus – On Poems, On Rhetoric, and On Music. 
 
J.’s stress on the physical fragmentation of the text, and the consequent three-dimensional jigsaw 
puzzle of its reconstruction, is well placed, as he shows in the first four chapters, in which he 
gives a fascinating history of the Herculaneum papyri, and especially of the papyrus roll of On 
 1
Poems One, its discovery, opening and editing since the eighteenth century.  After a brief but 
informative introduction to Philodemus and his aesthetic works in chapter one, chapter two 
launches straight into the encyclopedic detail that characterizes the whole book.  Here J. shows 
that the task of reconstructing the original order of the papyrus fragments has been made even 
more complicated by the efforts of the eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars who worked 
upon them, referring to the ‘abysmal standards of editing’ of the past (14).  The catalogue of 
fragmentation and layers of indeterminacy is remarkable: the papyrus fragments of On Poems 
survive in six different scribal hands; much of the original papyrus was destroyed by the 
clumsiness of the initial opening of the rolls; much papyrus from the rolls, once preserved, has 
since been lost and survives recorded, often imperfectly, only as transcripts; many of these 
transcripts themselves have only recently been rediscovered; although most of the fragments 
have been published before they were in the main very badly edited and presented in a 
‘completely jumbled’ order ‘in an almost random sequence’ in which correct ordering of 
fragments occurred only by luck.  Only perhaps 45 per cent of On Poems 1 survives as either 
papyrus or transcripts, and that papyrus is so blackened that it is often almost impossible to read.   
However, this is only half of the story of the fragmentation to be met with in On Poems: in 
addition to this physical fragmentation and catalogue of loss and jumbling of fragments is added 
the extraordinary complexity, fragmentation, and indeterminacy of the subject matter of the text 
itself.  On Poems is a work of Hellenistic literary theory, in which Philodemus gives a critical 
catalogue of an earlier critical catalogue, by an unnamed philosopher (the Stoic Crates, as J. 
shows by comparing On Poems Five).  Crates gave a catalogue of opinions on poetic theory by 
writers whose names are often known only to us from the works of Philodemus himself, and 
whose opinions having been run through Crates’ philosophical filter in the earlier critical 
catalogue are now run through Philodemus’ own philosophical filter, with all the possible 
distortion and polemical selectivity that entails.  The context then, into which the work must be 
placed and against which it must be interpreted, is largely lost and often can only be 
reconstructed from Philodemus’ text, which itself can only be reconstructed and interpreted from 
that context.  It is no wonder then, that, as J. says, four previous attempts to edit On Poems 1 
were never published.  To make matters even worse, two of these previous editions have since 
been lost, and only two are still extant!  The task then of preventing any argument advanced on 
these fragments becoming circular is immense, and J.’s decision to attempt the work is one of 
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outstanding bravery.  That it took him nine years to complete is not surprising; that it took so 
short a time is remarkable. 
To look at both papyrus and the text in more detail: the Herculaneum papyri were preserved 
when the library of the villa of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus was engulfed by pyroclastic flows 
of volcanic mud and ash from the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD.1  This was superheated to 300-
320 0C and so the papyri were carbonized.  They were discovered in 1752-4, and the process of 
opening and trying to unroll them began soon after.  As J. explains (16ff), they were opened by 
three methods (J. provides a useful illustration in his fig. 2): scorzatura, svolgimento, and 
sollevamento, sometimes singly and sometimes in combination.  Originally, the rolls were 
simply chopped in half right through the longitudinal axis (scorzatura totale), a process that 
destroyed the middles of the rolls leaving only the concave outer layers.  Then shallower cuts 
were tried, not reaching to the middle of the roll, which could then be extracted (scorzatura). 
Some of these middles were later unwound by a machine invented by Antonio Piaggio 
(svolgimento).  The semi-circular scorze produced by scorzatura were read by a process called 
sfogliamento in which, working outwards from the inside of the roll, a layer was drawn, and then 
destroyed by scraping off to reveal the next layer beneath.  Only the final, outer layer of the 
papyrus was preserved.  Another method was to attempt to lift each layer of the scorze off the 
one beneath (sollevamento), working inwards from the outside of the roll.  This did not 
necessarily involve the destruction of the papyrus, but had the disadvantage that several layers 
tended to lift off at once.  Finally, whole papyri could be unwound by svolgimento on Piaggio’s 
machine.  The roll of On Poems 1 was probably subject to scorzatura totale and thus no middle 
has survived, and, as J. shows, was read by both sfogliamento and sollevamento. 
So, the first problem faced by an editor is that little papyrus remains, and many of the 
transcripts of fragments were not entirely accurate, or were selective in what they chose to record 
(ignoring letters of incomplete words at the edges of a fragment for instance).  The second 
problem is that of the original numbering and ordering of the fragments.  The amazing fact is that 
the correct method of the ordering of the scorze produced by chopping a roll down the middle 
was discovered only recently by Dirk Obbink and Daniel Delattre.2  They independently 
discovered that all earlier attempts at ordering the fragments had taken no account of which 
                                                 
1 See the Philodemus Project website online at: 
http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/humnet/classics/philodemus/philhome.htm 
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method of opening the papyri had been used.  In the case of a roll opened by sfogliamento then – 
scraping away layers of papyrus from the inside of the roll outwards – it was not previously 
realized that the roll was being read backwards, and so the fragments were ordered backwards.  
However in many cases simply putting the fragments in inverse order does not restore their 
original order since one roll would often be subject to a variety of opening techniques including 
lifting off layers of papyrus which produces a natural forwards ordering of fragments.   
After detailing the prehistory of the scholarship, opening, recording and editing of the 
fragments, J. turns to their format and script, and their syllabification, orthography and 
punctuation.  There follows in chapter four J.’s description of his own reconstruction of the 
fragments, including detailed tables of joins and parallels, and even detailed tables of the 
reconstruction of their order by measuring the decreasing circumference of the papyrus roll as 
the fragments move towards the middle of the roll. 
Then in chapter five we are given a summary of the arguments of On Poems 1 in which J. 
goes through each of the critics and philosophers in the Stoic Crates’ catalogue, detailing their 
arguments and Philodemus’ rebuttal of each argument and rebuttal of Crates’ own views.  This is 
where things begin to get complicated.  As I say above Philodemus’ presents a critical catalogue 
of a previous critical catalogue by Crates.  Due to the fragmentary nature of the book, it is often 
very difficult to tell whether we are reading Crates’ own views, his presentation of the views of 
his opponents, Philodemus’ version of the views of Crates’ opponents, or Philodemus’ own 
views.  J. reconstructs the arguments of On Poems 1 as follows: 
 
Crates against the ‘philosophers’ (early Epicureans). 
Crates on Megaclides of Athens. 
Crates on Andromenides. 
Crates against the ‘critics’. 
Crates on Heracleodorus. 
Crates on Pausimachus.  
Philodemus’ recapitulation of Crates’ catalogue. 
Philodemus’ rebuttal of each argument. 
     
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The Obbink-Delattre method, described by J. on p. 19-20. 
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 The arguments in On Poems 1 are essentially on the relationship between form and content in the 
judgement of poetry.  Crates of Mallos was a Stoic philosopher, grammarian and critic described 
in the Suda as ‘a Stoic philosopher surnamed “Homerist” and “Critic”’,3 whose work as a 
grammarian, as J. tells us, made him famous and who visited Rome in 168-7 BC.  J. (121) 
describes his views as follows: 
 
Crates advocated a method of literary judgement independent of philosophy and grammar, in 
which sound is the sole criterion for excellence in verse.  This is the natural excellence of a 
poem, inherent in the verse and recognized intuitively by the ear.  Critics do not evaluate a poem 
by judging its content or our pleasure in its sound; instead we judge by the ear the rational 
principles (logika\ qewrh/mata) that inhere in the verse, and ‘not without the contents, but not the 
contents themselves’.  This means that the critic is aware of the content without judging it in 
itself when he evaluates the form; presumably it is the task of the philosopher, not the critic, to 
judge the sense.  Crates’ position represents a compromise between a moralist and a formalist 
approach.  Like Philodemus, he denies that one can judge form without reference to the content; 
this is the main point where his views diverge from those of the euphonists. 
 
Crates begins by attacking the arguments of certain unnamed philosophers whom J. identifies as 
early Epicureans.  They argue, Crates says, that poetic excellence is judged by arbitrary norms, 
and that there is no natural criterion for judging verse but only conventional criteria which will 
vary from one person to another.  Here clearly we are in the territory of nature and convention, 
and Philodemus complains that Crates has oversimplified the position, and that the Epicureans 
posit a third intermediate stage between nature and convention: we judge poetry not by naturally 
occurring criteria but by universal preconceptions (prolh/yseij) of good and bad verses.  Thus 
Philodemus comes close to the ‘natural criteria’ position, but still insists we judge verse by 
convention.    
Philodemus then moves on to criticize Crates’ criticisms of the ‘musical critics’, those who 
ascribe the judgement of poetry entirely to the ear.  Philodemus complains that he has unjustly 
included in this group the Peripatetic Megaclides of Athens.  The views of Megaclides are lost 
apart from Philodemus’ very lacunose report here.  It seems however, that he probably argued 
that divine beings should be portrayed in fitting sounds, and as J. says, he also wrote of the 
pleasure and enchantment of the soul caused by poetry.  Philodemus complains that Megaclides 
                                                 
3 Suda s.v.  Kra/thj (k 2342 Adler). 
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makes too little distinction between music and poetry: songs enthrall us through the ear, while 
verse enthralls through the intellect.   
Philodemus then moves on to another critic, Andromenides.  Apparently Crates had claimed 
that he was in complete agreement with Andromenides, but, Philodemus says, Crates had 
misunderstood him.  Philodemus does not tell us what Andromenides’ views were, but as J. 
(144) puts it: 
 
Andromenides advocated the importance of the hearing in the judgement of poetry; but he did 
not hold that the perception of poetry is entirely irrational.  Whereas prose aims at truth and 
utility, poetry aims to please and enthrall the ordinary person by its distinctive expression ... 
There is no suggestion that poetry can instruct us as well as give pleasure. 
 
Now we are in the territory of ‘the contrast between truth and instruction versus and 
enthrallment’ (147) which of course will be crucial in our understanding of Hellenistic theories 
on didactic poetry. 
Next comes a very lacunose section in which Philodemus discussed Crates’ criticisms of those 
critics who argue that the content of a poem is outside the art of poetry, while Crates considered 
content to be a part of the art of poetry but was not judged separately in itself.  It seems that 
Heracleodorus was chief among these critics.  Heracleodorus:  
 
 ... denied the relevance of the traditional genre-divisions and different styles to the merit of 
poetry; he even denied that of metre, claiming that some prose writers were poets.  He held that 
both the contents and the words are extraneous to the poetic art, and irrelevant to its quality: what 
matters is word-order (su/nqesij) and the sound that supervenes upon it. (156) 
 
 
According to Heracleodorus then, the particularity (i)/dion) of poetry that distinguishes it from 
prose is euphony and that this euphony arises from the order of the words.  If then we change the 
word-order of a line of verse (meta/qesij) we can render it prose rather than poetry and yet leave 
the meaning unchanged.  Philodemus argues on the contrary that the meaning must always be 
changed to some degree by meta/qesij. 
The next critic treated is Pausimachus who held views even more extreme than the previous 
euphonists.  Pausimachus is again unknown from elsewhere and again his views have to be 
reconstructed from Philodemus’ fragmentary text.  It seems that while Heracleodorus was an 
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advocate of the euphony caused by su/nqesij he did not provide any analysis of euphony itself, 
and this Pausimachus sets out to provide.  Pausimachus too argued that plot or content of any 
kind is irrelevant to good poetry and that euphony caused by su/nqesij is the i)/dion of poetry.  
Genre and character are also irrelevant and good poets are better than bad ones simply because 
their sounds are better.  He goes on to analyse euphony into individual sounds and individual 
letters.  L for instance is a euphonious letter while s and c are cacophonous.  Thus at the level of 
analysis below su/nqesij sound caused by the natures of the letters themselves is more important 
than su/nqesij.  He proves this by applying meta/qesij to the words of verse, showing that even 
meta/qesij cannot render words containing cacophonous letters euphonious.  Metre likewise is 
irrelevant to euphony, since replacing euphonious words with cacophonous words of metrical 
equivalence still produces cacophony.  Now we are in the very important territory of natural 
sounds and this also takes us into theories of the rightness and origins of names and indeed into 
theories of the origins of language itself.  From what may have seemed so far perhaps a rather 
sterile debate between content and form, arguments on the fundamental nature of language itself 
have developed.  Euphonists such as Pausimachus believed that a good poet produced good 
poetry because he used sounds that pleased the many.  They did so because these sounds 
reflected the real nature of things and so produced a natural response from the hearer.  These 
sounds were coined by an original name-maker who designed words to suit the nature of the 
thing they describe.  J. traces the development of this idea from Pythagoras, through Cratylus and 
others, and concludes (189): 
 
The theories of the Euphonists have also had a wider significance.  Their belief that there is a 
natural relation between sound and meaning contains only a kernel of truth, since onomatopoeia 
is a special case in the generally arbitrary semiotics of natural language ... It opened the door to 
etymological and allegorical mumbo jumbo of every kind, which did much to reverse the 
progress of human rationality for many centuries ... 
 
 Thus far J.’s summary of the arguments of On Poems 1.  Now to turn to the arguments of 
Philodemus himself.  After surveying Crates’ critical catalogue Philodemus goes on to rebut each 
argument in turn.  Thus his own views appear gradually as he rebuts those of others and have to 
be reconstructed from his polemics.  As I say above, Crates considered that sound is the sole 
criterion for excellence in verse but allowed a place for content.  We judge the sound and the ear 
judges the rational principles that inhere in the verse and which bring along with them the 
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content.  Thus we do judge the content but not separately from the sound and only vicariously as 
it were.  Philodemus is concerned to rescue content and establish its importance in poetry. He 
argues that we have a preconception both of good form and good content in verse and that from 
this comes our pleasure in poetry.  In fact it is the presentation of content in poetry that moves 
us: euphony alone leaves us unmoved.  The content of poetry is judged by the rational faculties, 
and the effect of poetry is produced by a combination of sound and content.  Both sound and 
content, then, are the complementary and inseparable i)/dia of poetry.   Meta/qesij whether of 
letters or words will always the meaning of the poetry, and so the euphonists are wrong to argue 
that euphony alone is the i)/dion of poetry.4  This is all very well as far as it goes: Philodemus 
was a poet as well as a philosopher and so was concerned to rescue poetry from becoming a mere 
meaningless arrangement of attractive sounds.  But how far does On Poems 1 take us towards an 
understanding of the Epicurean view of the relationship between philosophy and poetry and of 
the status of didactic poetry?  This question is inevitable of course because we have the extant 
works of two Epicurean poets, Philodemus and Lucretius.  J. sees Lucretius’ decision to write 
philosophical didactic poetry as a further extension of Philodemus’ position that content in 
poetry is important, but on the other hand we know that Philodemus was firmly opposed to the 
use of poetry for didactic purposes, and considered that prose was the more powerful medium, 
and the proper medium, for the conveyance of ideas.  As is well known, Epicurus himself 
allowed that the philosopher may listen to poetry for pleasure but saw poetry, especially the 
poetry of Homer, as the dangerous handmaiden of false religion.   In his view, poetry, along with 
sacrifices and religious processions had been originally responsible for the spread of religious 
error.5  Epicurus, unlike Philodemus, did allow the didactic force of poetry then, but saw its 
teaching only in negative terms.  For him the glamour and charm of poetry was a dangerous 
siren-song, and so he seems to have seen poetry as a more powerful and thus more dangerous 
vehicle for the conveyance of ideas than is prose, at least of false ideas.  In this Lucretius seems 
to be much closer to Epicurus than is Philodemus: Lucretius saw that if poetry is such a powerful 
medium for falsehood, then it may be used against itself as it were, and against falsehood by its 
power to spread ideas through it attractiveness and glamour.  He seems to have taken much of 
                                                 
4 For the implications of Philodemus’ insistence of the impossibility of meta/qesij and its relationship to the 
Democritean and Lucretian analogy between letters and atoms, see especially the articles by Asmis, 
Porter, and Armstrong in D. Obbink (ed.) Philodemus and Poetry (Oxford, 1995). 
5 See Dirk Obbink, ‘How to Read Poetry about Gods’, in D. Obbink (ed.), 1995, 189-219. 
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this approach from Empedocles, and to have simply inverted Epicurus’ position.  Philodemus on 
the other hand seems to occupy something of an uncomfortable position with regard to Epicurean 
orthodoxy.  He denies the validity of didactic poetry while at the same time defending the 
importance of content in poetry.  Indeed as David Armstrong has shown,6 for Philodemus, 
content in didactic poetry was simply the ‘honey round the cup’ while of course for Lucretius 
form enticed the reader in.   I find it difficult to see, as J. does, that Augustan poets, especially 
Vergil and Horace can be seen developing Philodemus’ ideas of the importance of content in 
poetry.  Vergil especially takes his lead directly from Lucretius in his move into didactic and 
epic poetry.   
On Poems 1 will inevitably be valuable evidence for our debates on the relationship between 
Lucretius and Epicurus and between poetry and philosophy, and our knowledge will deepen with 
the publication of the other books of On Poems.  In this J. has done sterling service for 
scholarship, and as I say above, his reconstruction and editing of the papyrus ranks as an 
outstanding feat of scholarship.  On the other hand, there are inevitable criticisms of the book to 
be made.  Inevitably the fragmentary nature of the text makes this a very difficult book to read.  
Further, although J. defends Philodemus both as a prose writer and a philosopher, I have a strong 
suspicion that Philodemus is neither a good writer of prose nor a terribly good philosopher.  This 
adds to the difficulty of interpreting his arguments and makes clear and lucid analysis and 
presentation of the arguments more necessary.  However, J. has a strong tendency to allow his 
arguments and analysis to develop gradually, not separating his very detailed and difficult 
evidence from his conclusions.  This makes it very difficult to find his conclusions in the text, 
and his summaries in the first and sixth chapters are brief and somewhat lacking in depth.  He 
also makes no great attempts to extrapolate from his evidence.7  As I say we have the works of 
two Epicurean poets, yet I can find only a few brief references to Lucretius in the book.  Further, 
I find the layout of the text and commentary somewhat confusing.  The text is laid out in column 
form on the left-hand page with the critical apparatus alongside it.  Then the text is laid out on 
the right-hand page with the translation underneath, and the commentary as a series of footnotes 
to the translation beneath that.  This method seems much less user-friendly than Dirk Obbink’s 
                                                 
6 In Obbink (ed.), 1995, 218. 
7 Compare David Armstrong’s stimulating discussion of the implications of meta/qesij in Lucretius and Philodemus 
On Poems 5: ‘The Impossibility of Metathesis: Philodemus and Lucretius on Form and Content in Poetry’, in 
Obbink (ed.), 1995, 210-32. 
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technique of providing a separate commentary at the back of his edition of Philodemus On Piety, 
and gives far less space for detailed analysis and discussion of the arguments. 
Despite these criticisms, J. has produced from remarkably difficult and randomly fragmented 
material, after nine years labour and employing a polymathic range of knowledge and skills, an 
extremely valuable addition to scholarship on Hellenistic philosophy and poetic theory.      
     
 10
